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THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. 
(A Paper read before the S)ldney llttiversily E,;,gi;mn"ng Socid)', on 
November 14th, 1906}, 
By D. S. EDWARDS, B.A., LL.D. 
One frequently hears t he terms " agreement" and " conkact" 
used as conveTtible terms; but this is not strictly correct. If I 
ask a man to dinner, and he accepts my invitation, that i!, clear-
ly an « agreement" on his part, but it certa~nly is not a "co~ ~ 
tract." There is no legal obligation upon hlm to carry out ips 
agreement; he is bound by a meTely social obligation. \Va 
may, therefore, define a contract as being "an agreement ~n­
forcable at law, made between two or more persons, by whlCh 
rights are acquired by one or more to acts or forbearances Oil the 
part of the other or others." In order to constitute an ",~ree­
ment enforceable at law:-
1. There must be a dist inct communication by one, side .t.q 
the other of their intent ion, i .e. , there must be offer and 
acceptance. 
2. There must. be certain evidence, required by law, that t.he 
part.ies in tend to affect. t.heir legal r elations, i,e., there must be 
form or consideration. 
3, The parties must. be capable of making a valid contract . 
4. The oonsent, expressed by t he offer and acceptance must 
begenuine . . 
5. The objects of the oontrct mllst be legal. Learned 
writers on the law of contract require books of laFge size . to 
explain, eyen briefly, the details of that law. I, therefore, find 
great difficulty in approaching such a large subject when the 
time allotted to me is so brief. But a rough general outline of 
t he subject may be best obtained by cop.siderin~ a little more 
fully each of the topics I have ' just mentioned. Now, in the 
first place, every contract springs from the acceptance of an offer.· 
Thus, if we see a finally concluded contract, wherebj A. agreeli' 
to sell a hor se to B. for £5, t hat nece~sarily implies a momen~ 
at which A. says, "Will you give me £5 for my horse 1" And 
~ . says, " I will." Upon saying those mystic words the contract 
IS concluded for richer, for poorer, for bettp.r, for worse, until 
the lawyers do t heir part. It i& not necessary that either the 
?ffe~ or the acceptance should be in actual words- either may be 
mdlCated by conduct. Thus, if I offer X £5 to do a certain piecl;'! 
pf work ~nd X t hereupon do~s it, I ,WI b?und by contract to pay 
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him t e £5-his oondU<i1t is an acceptance iIff my offer. So, if A 
sends goods to my house and I use them, though never a word 
has passed betwen ' us, I am 'bound by contract to pay him' the 
value of the goods- the offer and the accept~nce are both in such 
a case made by oonduct . 
. But an offer is not ·· made until it is communicated to the 
off~ree. . This, at first sight appears a truism, but on closer ex-
amination it will be seen to be t he principle upon which many 
questions are decided. One case which illustrates this principle 
is Henderson v. Stevenson (L.R. 2 H.L.. Sc, App. 470): the 
plaintiff bought from . the defendant company a ticket by steamer 
from Dublin to Whitehaven.. On the face of the ticket were 
t hese words only, "Dublin t o 'Whitehaven" ; on t he back was an 
intimat ion that t he company incurred no liability for loss of pas-
senger's ·luggage. The vessel was wrecked and the luggage lost. 
The plaintiff claimed that t he oompany ought to pay for t ne 
luggage- true it was that he had since learnt t hat there were con· 
ditions on t he back of the t icket, but t he only offer communicated 
t o him was t he one he had seen on the face of his ticket, and that 
was the only off·er that he had accepted. The House of Lords 
upheld ~h e plaint iff's contention , but companies have since then 
becom~ more cautious, and now generally refer to t he condit ions 
on the back of the t icket by printing on the face of it, "See 
back." It t hen becomes a question to bQ decided by the jury 
whether the ticket amounted to a reasonable n ot.ice t hat it was 
issued subject to th e co·nditions printed on it.- I r emember one 
case of this nature in which a clerk of th~ defendant company stated 
in t he witness box that he always told passengers, when they 
bought a ticket, t hat it was issued subject to the conditions 
printed on t he back of it. _No doubt., in this particular instance, 
that statement was quite true ; but if many ot her clerks in a 
similar position gave such evidence" one would e,xpect t h em to oc-
cupy the third place in that classificat ion of witnesses by the late 
MontlJ.gue William~, Q.C., in which he divided them into : 
1. Liars . 
. 2. D-- liars. 
3. E xperts. 
In the same way, an aooptance must be communicated by words 
or conduct- as a judge (Brian C. J.) said in the reign of Edward 
IV.: "It is trite learning that. the t hought of man is not triable, 
for the devil himself knows not the thought of man. " Thus in 
the case 'of Felt house v. Brindley (11 C.B.N.S. 869) F elthouse 
offere~ to buy his nephew's horse for £30, adding "If I hear no 
more about him I shall consider t he horse is mine at £30." The 
nephew made no answer to this let ter, but he t 0ld Brindley, an 
auct ioneer, to keep the horse out of a sale of his farm stock, as it 
was sold to his uncle F elt house. Brindley sold the horse by mis-
take and the uncle sued him for its value. But. it was held tll' .'. 
t he horse had n ever become t he uncle's- the nophew had never 
communicfloted to him 3-n acceptance of his offer . 
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But it is not always necessa}'y that t he acceptance should be 
verbal Ol' by d'rect communication with the offeror j acceptance is 
communicat ed when it is made in the manner prescribed or in -
d 'icated by the offeror. Cont ract s made by post form a very 
good illustrat ion of this rule. Thus, in A dams ,v. L indsell (1 
B. and HId. 681) Lindsell offered to sell wool to Adams by letter 
dated 2nd September, " receiving your answer in' due course of 
post" - i. c., he indicated the manner in which the offer could be 
accepted. He misdirected his letter, so that AdalIlJl did not re-
ceive it until the 5th. Adam's posted a letter of Clicceptance on the 
evening of the 5th, but Lindsel1 had meantime sold the wool to 
others. Adams sued for breach of contract, and it was aI1gued 
that there was no contract between the part ies till t he letter of 
~cceptance was actually received. . But t he Court scouted t his 
argument and held that the contract was made when t he accept-
allce was communica~ed in the manner prescribed by the , offeror-
i.e., was put in the 0t. It follows, t hat in such a: case the con-
tract would have been effectually made, even though the lett er of 
acceptance was lost or delayed in t he post j t he offeror chooses the 
post office as his agent and is bound by his choice. , 
An offer, of course, creates no legal rights unt il it is accepted j 
but it may lapse or be revoked. 1'hu3, if either p~,rty dies be-
fore acceptance of t he offer, it lapses--the offeror cannot be bound 
to a dead offeree's representat ive, nor can an offeree hold a dead 
offeror's representatives to th~ offer. 
Sometimes pa,rties fix ,a time within which an offer is to re-
main open- e.g ., " This offer to be left open till 6 p.m. on Tuesday, 
15th June" ; this leaves it open to the offeror to revoke, or the 
offeree to accept, the offer at any time up to the t ime named. A 
promise to keep an offer open for a certain time only becomes 
bin ding, if the party making the offer is t o get some bene,fit by 
·keeping it open- in other words if t here is a valid contract to keep 
it open for a specified time. And even if t here is no revocation of 
the offer, the offer may lapse by the effl ux of a r easonable time. 
Thus in Ramsgate Hotel Co. v. Montenore (L .R., 1 Exch. 109), 
the defendant by letter dated 28th June offered to buy certain 
shares from the company; no answer was made till 23rd November, 
.when he ,vas informed that t he shares were a llotted to him. He 
refused to accept, and it was held t hat the offer had lapsed by 
reason of the delay of the company in noti fying their acceptance. 
But revocation of an offer, as distinct from lapse, must be com-
municated. Thus A makes me an offer ·- within a re,asonable 
time, he. r evokes hIS offer but does not tell me that 'he has revoked 
it j the offer is still open to me, and may be accepted within a 
r esonable time or within the time fixed in the offer; a mere mental 
revocation of an offer is no revocation at all. 
An offer n eed not be made to an asoertained person, but to 
make a contract it must be accepted by an ascertained person. 
This principle :t;eceived a very neat illustration in the case of Carlill 
v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. lL.R. (1 893) 10' B. 268]: the company 
{}fiered by advertisement-i.e., not t.o a~ly ascertained person, but to 
everybo.dy-to pay £100 to anyone ,,;ho caught cold after using the 
ball for three weeks according to directions, and stated that they 
had deposited £1000 with .a bank to show their sincerity in the 
matter. This simple faith in the efficacy of their remedy led the 
plaintiff to try it: she took it for three weeks and in accordance 
with the direction-and then caught cold. She t hereupon sued 
the company on the contract formed by her acceptance (by con-
duct) of the, oompany's offer and obtained a verdict. No doubt 
thEi remedy t us applied had a much more beneficial .effect on her 
cold. The company tried to get out of their contract by saying 
that the offer was a mere puff or advert isement, and not intended 
seriously j but the Court gravely pointed out to them their pub-
lished announcement that they had deposited £.1000 wit h a bank 
to prove the sincerity of their offer. 
I propose to mention only one other point of this branch of 
my subject, but it is a point that is of t he ut most importance, and 
one that is very often lost sight of by business people. The rule 
of law is that an ac_ceptance must be absolute a nd ident ical wit h 
the terms of the offer. " It is quite obvious that if I offer to sell 
property fOT £100 a nd a would-be buyer writes back saying he will 
give me £95, that no contract is made- the acceptance is not 
ldentical with . the terms of t he offer j in fact, the alleged accept-
ance is really a new offer. 'But, though a simple case like this 
shows that the rule ment ioned is merely common sense, neglect to 
gi ve a careful con~ideration to business letters frequently results 
jn parties, who fancy t hey have a binding contract, finding them-
selves with, no contract at all. Only th'is year (6 S .R. 10 Z) ,. the 
Sydney Harbour T,rust Commissioners brought an action on a con : 
tract fOl a lease against Warburton, and attempted to prove their 
contract by putting in evidence t heir offer and a letter from War-
burton in these words, "I am willing to accept a lease on the terms 
named and to comply with your condit ions re stacking coal 
against the fence. I will expect to get preference on expiration 
of lease. The drainage of stables will also be included in the 
specification, also water for horses laid on, and a small W,C ." 
The Hal'oour Commissioners' offer did not contain any reference to 
tb.e matters mentioned in Warburton 's letter, and it was, there-. 
fore, held that there nev,ar had been any acceptance of the Com-
missioners' offer a.nd, consequently, there wa.s no contract. Sir 
William Owen, in his judgment on this part of t he case, said: 
" in the final letter written by tbe defendant (War-
burton) accepting some of the terms of tbe lease proposed in the 
Jetters from the plaintiffs he imposed certain q.dditional terms, and 
there is no evidence to show that these additional terms were ever 
a.ocepted by the plaintiffs. It is therefore quite clear to my mind 
that the matter rested simply on negotiation and no more." 
It is, therefore, not useless 'reiteration for me to again point 
out that an acceptance of an offer must be absoluw, and identical 
with the terms of the 'Qffer" . 
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I come now to another of the essential elements to a valid con-
tract-that is the subject of Form and Consideration. Contracts 
are !iivisable into two great classes-Formal Contracts and Simple 
Contracts. Formal contracts are those which depend for their 
validity on their form, and include Contracts of Reoord and Con-
tracts under Seal. A judgment of the Court is the commonest ex-
ample of a Oontract of Record-that is the highest form of contract 
known to th-a law. It, is not necessary to deal with it here, as u 
enable a contract to reach that stage is a matter which is more tne 
concern of my profession than of yours. The other kind of Formal 
Contract is the Contract under Seal-i.e., a deed. A deed is made 
binding between parties by being signed, sealed and delivered. 
The party executing a deed signs his name, places his finger on the 
seal intended for him, and utters the words, "1 deliver this as my 
~C~ and deed." Thus he at once identifies himself with the sea. ; 
and indicates his intention to deliver, i.e., to ' give operation to, the 
deed. A deed may be delivered subject to a condition-e.g., that 
it is not to become opera.tive until a certain event happe1Js: until 
that event happens it is called an escrO'w, but on the happening of 
the condition it immediately becomes operative. A contract under 
seal has certain characteristics which distinguish it from a Simple 
Contract. 
(1) Where a man enters ,into· 'a solemn engagement by deed 
as to certain facts, then all statements in the deed, if ex-
press and clear, are conclusive against the parties to the 
deed in any litigation arising upon it. He is not allowed 
to disprove facts, the truth of which he has asseverated in 
a deed. ' 
(2) A right of action arising out of simple contract is barred 
by the Sta. utes of Limitations if it is not exercised with-
in six years; but if the action arises out of a contract un-
der seal, the period of limitation is 20 years. 
(3) No consideration is required to support a contract under 
seal; a mere prDmise fDr which the promisor obtains no 
consideration either present Dr future is nDt enforceable 
if made verbally or in writing, but it is enforceable if 
under seal. itA seal imports consideration." 
Some contracts are not binding unless they are made under 
seal-some cases are specially fixed by statute, e .g., transfer of a 
ship, leases intended to take advantag~ of the Leases Facilitation 
Act, and some few other cases. Common law (i.e., as distinguish-
ed from Statute law) requires a deed in two cases-(I) Contracts 
for which there is no collsideration, and (2) a corporation aggregate 
(e.g., municipality) can only be bound by oontracts under the Cor-
porate seal. Thus, if a municipaliey wishes to make a contract 
u,> carry out important w~r~s, such contract is not enforceable by 
eIt~er party to It, unle~ It IS under seal; but the exigencies of 
busmess are such that If the oontracts of corporations are of 
trifling importance or of daily necessary recurrence, they may be 
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made verbally or in wribing wit hout seal. However, • all import-
ant cont racts with such badies must be under seal. I must here 
point out that a company registered under the Corporat ion Act is 
a corporation; but the Companies Act specially provides that con-
tracts made by and wit h such a body may be verbally entered into 
in the same form as in t he (:.l,se of individuals. I now come to the 
other great class of cont racts- Simple Contracts, i.e ., .contracts 
which depend for t heir validity upon the pr~nce of consideration . 
Of these, the law requires that some should be in writ ing, while 
others are quite good if they are merely verbal; but all a like re-
quire considerabion to support them. Consileration is really a. q~tid 
pro q1to-it may consist in some right, interest, profit, or benefit 
accruing to one party or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or ra--
sponsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by t he other. If one 
remembers t hat the law of contract requires that one should not 
take a benefit from another without giving somet hing for it in re-
turn, one gets a very good idea of what conside,ra.tiou is. It need 
not be adequate to t he promise, but must be of some value in t he 
eye , of the law. The following case will illust rate ,this rule:-B 
owned t wo boilers, a nd at t he request of F allowed him to weigh 
them on the terms t hat t hey were restored in as good condition as 
t hey were lent. F. t ook the boilers to pieces in order to weigh 
them and ret urned t hem in his state, and for breach of his 
promise B sued him. It was argued t:hat B suffered no det riment, 
nor did F get any benefit by permission to weigh t he boilers and 
that there was ,no consideration for the promise to restore t hem in 
good condit ion. But the defendant was held liable- " The con-
siderat ion is t hat the plaintiff, at t he defendant 's request, had con-
sented to allow the defendant to weigh t he boilers. I suppose 
the defendant thought h,e had some benefit; at any rate t here is 
a detriment to t he plaint iff fr,om his parting with the possession fo,r 
ever so short a time. " 
One other important rule to n o.t ice on the . subject of considera-
tion is that it must be present or future, it must not be past. 
Thus, if I verbally promise t o give X £ 5 if he will pull me out of 
the water into which I have fallen, X , on pulling me out, has a con-
tractual right to t he £5 ; but if , after I 'am pulled out , I promise to 
. pay X £ 5 in consideration of his having pulled me out-that is a 
past considerat ion, and is no,t sufficient to support a contract. 
The,re is one exception to this rule-that if the past consideration 
was moved by a previous request, it will support a cont ract. 
Thus, in tlie case put , if X had pulled me out of t he water at my 
request and I had then promsied him the £ 5. for ha.ving done so, a 
good cont ractJt would be formed- the consideration (i. e., t he pulling 
out of the water) was' moved at. my request. All Simple Contracts 
require consideration to suppor t t hem ; but, further, some Simple 
Contracts are not enforceable unless t hey are in writing and sign-
ed by the party chargeable t herewit h or his agent duly authorised 
th(;lreto. The requirement of writing is imposed by Statutes, the 
